資本論 AFTERWORD TO THE SECOND GERMAN EDITION (MARX, 1873)

I

must

start

by

informing

the

readers

of

the

first

edition

about

the

alterations

made

in

the

second

edition.

One

is

struck

at

once

by

the

clearer

arrangement

of

the

book.

Additional

notes

are

everywhere

marked

as

notes

to

the

second

edition.

The

following

are

the

most

important

points

with

regard

to

the

text

itself:

In

Chapter

I,

Section

1,

the

derivation

of

value

from

an

analysis

of

the

equations

by

which

every

exchange

value

is

expressed

has

been

carried

out

with

greater

scientific

strictness;

likewise

the

connexion

between

the

substance

of

value

and

the

determination

of

the

magnitude

of

value

by

socially

necessary

labour

time,

which

was

only

alluded

to

in

the

first

edition,is

now

expressly

emphasised.

Chapter

I,

Section

3(the

Form

of

Value),

has

been

completely

revised,a

task

which

was

made

necessary

by

the

double

exposition

in

the

first

edition,

if

nothing

else.

–

Let

me

remark,

in

passing,

that

that

double

exposition

had

been

occasioned

by

my

friend,

Dr.

L

Kugelmann

in

Hanover.

I

was

visiting

him

in

the

spring

of

1867

when

the

first

proof-sheets

arrived

from

Hamburg,and

he

convinced

me

that

most

readers

needed

a

supplementary,

more

didactic

explanation

of

the

form

of

value.

–

The

last

section

of

the

first

chapter,

\"The

Fetishism

of

Commodities,

etc.,\"

has

largely

been

altered.

Chapter

III,

Section

I

(The

Measure

of

Value),

has

been

carefully

revised,

because

in

the

first

edition

this

section

had

been

treated

negligently,

the

reader

having

been

referred

to

the

explanation

already

given

in

\"Zur

Kritik

der

Politischen

Oekonomie,\"

Berlin

1859.

Chapter

VII,

particularly

Part

2

[Eng.

ed.,Chapter

IX,

Section

2],

has

been

re-written

to

a

great

extent.

It

would

be

a

waste

of

time

to

go

into

all

the

partial

textual

changes,

which

were

often

purely

stylistic.They

occur

throughout

the

book.

Nevertheless

I

find

now,

on

revising

the

French

translation

appearing

in

Paris,

that

several

parts

of

the

German

original

stand

in

need

of

rather

thorough

remoulding,

other

parts

require

rather

heavy

stylistic

editing,

and

still

others

painstaking

elimination

of

occasional

slips.

But

there

was

no

time

for

that.

For

I

had

been

informed

only

in

the

autumn

of

1871,

when

in

the

midst

of

other

urgent

work,

that

the

book

was

sold

out

and

that

the

printing

of

the

second

edition

was

to

begin

in

January

of

1872.

The

appreciation

which

\"Das

Kapital\"

rapidly

gained

in

wide

circles

of

the

German

working

class

is

the

best

reward

of

my

labours.

Herr

Mayer,

a

Vienna

manufacturer,

who

in

economic

matters

represents

the

bourgeois

point

of

view,

in

a

pamphlet

published

during

the

Franco-German

War

aptly

expounded

the

idea

that

the

great

capacity

for

theory,

which

used

to

be

considered

a

hereditary

German

possession,had

almost

completely

disappeared

amongst

the

so

called

educated

classes

in

Germany,

but

that

amongst

its

working

class,

on

the

contrary,

that

capacity

was

celebrating

its

revival.

To

the

present

moment

Political

Economy,

in

Germany,

is

a

foreign

science.

Gustav

von

Gulich

in

his

\"Historical

description

of

Commerce,

Industry,\"&c.,

1especially

in

the

two

first

volumes

published

in

1830,

has

examined

at

length

the

historical

circumstances

that

prevented,

in

Germany,

the

development

of

the

capitalist

mode

of

production,

and

consequently

the

development,

in

that

country,of

modern

bourgeois

society.

Thus

the

soil

whence

Political

Economy

springs

was

wanting.

This\"science\"

had

to

be

imported

from

England

and

France

as

a

ready-made

article;

its

German

professors

remained

schoolboys.

The

theoretical

expression

of

a

foreign

reality

was

turned,

in

their

hands,

into

a

collection

of

dogmas,

interpreted

by

them

in

terms

of

the

petty

trading

world

around

them,

and

therefore

misinterpreted.

The

feeling

of

scientific

impotence,a

feeling

not

wholly

to

be

repressed,

and

the

uneasy

consciousness

of

having

to

touch

a

subject

in

reality

foreign

to

them,

was

but

imperfectly

concealed,

either

under

a

parade

of

literary

and

historical

erudition,

or

by

an

admixture

of

extraneous

material,

borrowed

from

the

so-called

\"Kameral\"

sciences,

a

medley

of

smatterings,

through

whose

purgatory

the

hopeful

candidate

for

the

German

bureaucracy

has

to

pass.

Since

1848

capitalist

production

has

developed

rapidly

in

Germany,

and

at

the

present

time

it

is

in

the

full

bloom

of

speculation

and

swindling.But

fate

is

still

unpropitious

to

our

professional

economists.

At

the

time

when

they

were

able

to

deal

with

Political

Economy

in

a

straightforward

fashion,modern

economic

conditions

did

not

actually

exist

in

Germany.

And

as

soon

as

these

conditions

did

come

into

existence,

they

did

so

under

circumstances

that

no

longer

allowed

of

their

being

really

and

impartially

investigated

within

the

bounds

of

the

bourgeois

horizon.

In

so

far

as

Political

Economy

remains

within

that

horizon,

in

so

far,

i.e.,

as

the

capitalist

regime

is

looked

upon

as

the

absolutely

final

form

of

social

production,

instead

of

as

a

passing

historical

phase

of

its

evolution,

Political

Economy

can

remain

a

science

only

so

long

as

the

class

struggle

is

latent

or

manifests

itself

only

in

isolated

and

sporadic

phenomena.

Let

us

take

England.

Its

Political

Economy

belongs

to

the

period

in

which

the

class

struggle

was

as

yet

undeveloped.

Its

last

great

representative,

Ricardo,

in

the

end,

consciously

makes

the

antagonism

of

class

interests,

of

wages

and

profits,

of

profits

and

rent,

the

starting

point

of

his

investigations,

naively

taking

this

antagonism

for

a

social

law

of

Nature.

But

by

this

start

the

science

of

bourgeois

economy

had

reached

the

limits

beyond

which

it

could

not

pass.

Already

in

the

lifetime

of

Ricardo,

and

in

opposition

to

him,

it

was

met

by

criticism,

in

the

person

of

Sismondi.

2

The

succeeding

period,

from

1820

to

1830,

was

notable

in

England

for

scientific

activity

in

the

domain

of

Political

Economy.

It

was

the

time

as

well

of

the

vulgarising

and

extending

of

Ricardo's

theory,

as

of

the

contest

of

that

theory

with

the

old

school.

Splendid

tournaments

were

held.

What

was

done

then,

is

little

known

to

the

Continent

generally,

because

the

polemic

is

for

the

most

part

scattered

through

articles

in

reviews,

occasional

literature

and

pamphlets.

The

unprejudiced

character

of

this

polemic

–

although

the

theory

of

Ricardo

already

serves,

in

exceptional

cases,as

a

weapon

of

attack

upon

bourgeois

economy

–

is

explained

by

the

circumstances

of

the

time.

On

the

one

hand,

modern

industry

itself

was

only

just

emerging

from

the

age

of

childhood,

as

is

shown

by

the

fact

that

with

the

crisis

of

1825

it

for

the

first

time

opens

the

periodic

cycle

of

its

modern

life.

On

the

other

hand,

the

class

struggle

between

capital

and

labour

is

forced

into

the

background,

politically

by

the

discord

between

the

governments

and

the

feudal

aristocracy

gathered

around

the

Holy

Alliance

on

the

one

hand,and

the

popular

masses,

led

by

the

bourgeoisie,

on

the

other;

economically

by

the

quarrel

between

industrial

capital

and

aristocratic

landed

property

-

a

quarrel

that

in

France

was

concealed

by

the

opposition

between

small

and

large

landed

property,

and

that

in

England

broke

out

openly

after

the

Corn

Laws.

The

literature

of

Political

Economy

in

England

at

this

time

calls

to

mind

the

stormy

forward

movement

in

France

after

Dr.

Quesnay's

death,

but

only

as

a

Saint

Martin's

summer

reminds

us

of

spring.

With

the

year

1830

came

the

decisive

crisis.

In

France

and

in

England

the

bourgeoisie

had

conquered

political

power.

Thenceforth,

the

class

struggle,

practically

as

well

as

theoretically,

took

on

more

and

more

outspoken

and

threatening

forms.

It

sounded

the

knell

of

scientific

bourgeois

economy.It

was

thenceforth

no

longer

a

question,

whether

this

theorem

or

that

was

true,

but

whether

it

was

useful

to

capital

or

harmful,

expedient

or

inexpedient,politically

dangerous

or

not.

In

place

of

disinterested

inquirers,

there

were

hired

prize

fighters;

in

place

of

genuine

scientific

research,

the

bad

conscience

and

the

evil

intent

of

apologetic.

Still,

even

the

obtrusive

pamphlets

with

which

the

Anti-Corn

Law

League,

led

by

the

manufacturers

Cobden

and

Bright,

deluged

the

world,

have

a

historic

interest,

if

no

scientific

one,

on

account

of

their

polemic

against

the

landed

aristocracy.But

since

then

the

Free

Trade

legislation,

inaugurated

by

Si

r

Robert

Peel,

has

deprived

vulgar

economy

of

this

its

last

sting.

The

Continental

revolution

of

1848-9

also

had

its

reaction

in

England.

Men

who

still

claimed

some

scientific

standing

and

aspired

to

be

something

more

than

mere

sophists

and

sycophants

of

the

ruling

classes

tried

to

harmonise

the

Political

Economy

of

capital

with

the

claims,

no

longer

to

be

ignored,

of

the

proletariat.

Hence

a

shallow

syncretism

of

which

John

Stuart

Mill

is

the

best

representative.

It

is

a

declaration

of

bankruptcy

by

bourgeois

economy,

an

event

on

which

the

great

Russian

scholar

and

critic,

N.Tschernyschewsky,

has

thrown

the

light

of

a

master

mind

in

his

\"Outlines

of

Political

Economy

according

to

Mill.\"

In

Germany,

therefore,

the

capitalist

mode

of

production

came

to

a

head,

after

its

antagonistic

character

had

already,

in

France

and

England,

shown

itself

in

a

fierce

strife

of

classes.

And

meanwhile,moreover,

the

German

proletariat

had

attained

a

much

more

clear

class-consciousness

than

the

German

bourgeoisie.

Thus,

at

the

very

moment

when

a

bourgeois

science

of

Political

Economy

seemed

at

last

possible

in

Germany,

it

had

in

reality

again

become

impossible.

Under

these

circumstances

its

professors

fell

into

two

groups.

The

one

set,

prudent,

practical

business

folk,

flocked

to

the

banner

of

Bastiat,

the

most

superficial

and

therefore

the

most

adequate

representative

of

the

apologetic

of

vulgar

economy;the

other,

proud

of

the

professorial

dignity

of

their

science,

followed

John

Stuart

Mill

in

his

attempt

to

reconcile

irreconcilables.

Just

as

in

the

classical

time

of

bourgeois

economy,

so

also

in

the

time

of

its

decline,

the

Germans

remained

mere

schoolboys,imitators

and

followers,

petty

retailers

and

hawkers

in

the

service

of

the

great

foreign

wholesale

concern.

The

peculiar

historical

development

of

German

society

therefore

forbids,

in

that

country,

all

original

work

in

bourgeois

economy;

but

not

the

criticism

of

that

economy.

So

far

as

such

criticism

represents

a

class,

it

can

only

represent

the

class

whose

vocation

in

history

is

the

overthrow

of

the

capitalist

mode

of

production

and

the

final

abolition

of

all

classes

–

the

proletariat.

The

learned

and

unlearned

spokesmen

of

the

German

bourgeoisie

tried

at

first

to

kill

\"Das

Kapital\"by

silence,

as

they

had

managed

to

do

with

my

earlier

writings.

As

soon

as

they

found

that

these

tactics

no

longer

fitted

in

with

the

conditions

of

the

time,they

wrote,

under

pretence

of

criticising

my

book,prescriptions

\"for

the

tranquillisation

of

the

bourgeois

mind.\"

But

they

found

in

the

workers'

press

–

see,e.g.,

Joseph

Dietzgen's

articles

in

the

–

antagonists

stronger

than

themselves,

to

whom

(down

to

this

very

day)

they

owe

a

reply.

3

An

excellent

Russian

translation

of

\"Das

Kapital\"appeared

in

the

spring

of

1872.

The

edition

of

3,000

copies

is

already

nearly

exhausted.

As

early

as

1871,N.

Sieber,

Professor

of

Political

Economy

in

the

University

of

Kiev,

in

his

work

\"David

Ricardo's

Theory

of

Value

and

of

Capital,\"

referred

to

my

theory

of

value,

of

money

and

of

capital,

as

in

its

fundamentals

a

necessary

sequel

to

the

teaching

of

Smith

and

Ricardo.

That

which

astonishes

the

Western

European

in

the

reading

of

this

excellent

work,

is

the

author's

consistent

and

firm

grasp

of

the

purely

theoretical

position.

That

the

method

employed

in

\"Das

Kapital\"

has

been

little

understood,

is

shown

by

the

various

conceptions,contradictory

one

to

another,

that

have

been

formed

of

it.

Thus

the

Paris

Revue

Positiviste

reproaches

me

in

that,on

the

one

hand,

I

treat

economics

metaphysically,

and

on

the

other

hand

–

imagine!

–

confine

myself

to

the

mere

critical

analysis

of

actual

facts,

instead

of

writing

receipts4(Comtist

ones)

for

the

cook-shops

of

the

future.

In

answer

to

the

reproach

in

re

metaphysics,Professor

Sieber

has

it:

\"In

so

far

as

it

deals

with

actual

theory,

the

method

of

Marx

is

the

deductive

method

of

the

whole

English

school,

a

school

whose

failings

and

virtues

are

common

to

the

best

theoretic

economists.\"

M.

Block

–

\"Les

Théoriciens

du

Socialisme

en

Allemagne.

Extrait

du

Journal

des

Economistes,Juillet

et

Aot

1872\"

–

makes

the

discovery

that

my

method

is

analytic

and

says:

\"Par

cet

ouvrage

M.Marx

se

classe

parmi

les

esprits

analytiques

les

plus

eminents.\"

German

reviews,

of

course,

shriek

out

at\"Hegelian

sophistics.\"

The

European

Messenger

of

St

.Petersburg

in

an

article

dealing

exclusively

with

the

method

of

\"Das

Kapital\"

(May

number,

1872,

pp.

427436),

finds

my

method

of

inquiry

severely

realistic,

but

my

method

of

presentation,

unfortunately,

German

dialectical.

It

says:

\"At

first

sight,

if

the

judgment

is

based

on

the

external

form

of

the

presentation

of

the

subject,Marx

is

the

most

ideal

of

ideal

philosophers,always

in

the

German,

i.e.,

the

bad

sense

of

the

word.

But

in

point

of

fact

he

is

infinitely

more

realistic

than

all

his

forerunners

in

the

work

of

economic

criticism.

He

can

in

no

sense

be

called

an

idealist.\"

I

cannot

answer

the

writer

better

than

by

aid

of

a

few

extracts

from

his

own

criticism,

which

may

interest

some

of

my

readers

to

whom

the

Russian

original

is

inaccessible.

After

a

quotation

from

the

preface

to

my

\"Criticism

of

Political

Economy,\"

Berlin,

1859,

pp.

IV-VII,

where

I

discuss

the

materialistic

basis

of

my

method,

the

writer

goes

on:

\"The

one

thing

which

is

of

moment

to

Marx,is

to

find

the

law

of

the

phenomena

with

whose

investigation

he

is

concerned;

and

not

only

is

that

law

of

moment

to

him,

which

governs

these

phenomena,

in

so

far

as

they

have

a

definite

form

and

mutual

connexion

within

a

given

historical

period.

Of

still

greater

moment

to

him

is

the

law

of

their

variation,

of

their

development,

i.e.,

of

their

transition

from

one

form

into

another,

from

one

series

of

connexions

into

a

different

one.

This

law

once

discovered,

he

investigates

in

detail

the

effects

in

which

it

manifests

itself

in

social

life.Consequently,

Marx

only

troubles

himself

about

one

thing:

to

show,

by

rigid

scientific

investigation,the

necessity

of

successive

determinate

orders

of

social

conditions,

and

to

establish,

as

impartially

as

possible,

the

facts

that

serve

him

for

fundamental

starting-points.

For

this

it

is

quite

enough,

if

he

proves,

at

the

same

time,

both

the

necessity

of

the

present

order

of

things,

and

the

necessity

of

another

order

into

which

the

first

must

inevitably

pass

over;

and

this

all

the

same,

whether

men

believe

or

do

not

believe

it,

whether

they

are

conscious

or

unconscious

of

it.

Marx

treats

the

social

movement

as

a

process

of

natural

history,governed

by

laws

not

only

independent

of

human

will,

consciousness

and

intelligence,

but

rather,

on

the

contrary,

determining

that

will,

consciousness

and

intelligence.

...

If

in

the

history

of

civilisation

the

conscious

element

plays

a

part

so

subordinate,then

it

is

self-evident

that

a

critical

inquiry

whose

subject-matter

is

civilisation,

can,

less

than

anything

else,

have

for

its

basis

any

form

of,

or

any

result

of,

consciousness.

That

is

to

say,

that

not

the

idea,

but

the

material

phenomenon

alone

can

serve

as

its

starting-point.

Such

an

inquiry

will

confine

itself

to

the

confrontation

and

the

comparison

of

a

fact,

not

with

ideas,

but

with

another

fact.

For

this

inquiry,

the

one

thing

of

moment

is,

that

both

facts

be

investigated

as

accurately

as

possible,

and

that

they

actually

form,

each

with

respect

to

the

other,

different

momenta

of

an

evolution;

but

most

important

of

all

is

the

rigid

analysis

of

the

series

of

successions,

of

the

sequences

and

concatenations

in

which

the

different

stages

of

such

an

evolution

present

themselves.

But

it

will

be

said,

the

general

laws

of

economic

life

are

one

and

the

same,

no

matter

whether

they

are

applied

to

the

present

or

the

past.

This

Marx

directly

denies.

According

to

him,

such

abstract

laws

do

not

exist.

On

the

contrary,

in

his

opinion

every

historical

period

has

laws

of

its

own.

...

As

soon

as

society

has

outlived

a

given

period

of

development,

and

is

passing

over

from

one

given

stage

to

another,

it

begins

to

be

subject

also

to

other

laws.

In

a

word,

economic

life

offers

us

a

phenomenon

analogous

to

the

history

of

evolution

in

other

branches

of

biology.

The

old

economists

misunderstood

the

nature

of

economic

laws

when

they

likened

them

to

the

laws

of

physics

and

chemistry.

A

more

thorough

analysis

of

phenomena

shows

that

social

organisms

differ

among

themselves

as

fundamentally

as

plants

or

animals.

Nay,

one

and

the

same

phenomenon

falls

under

quite

different

laws

in

consequence

of

the

different

structure

of

those

organisms

as

a

whole,

of

the

variations

of

their

individual

organs,

of

the

different

conditions

in

which

those

organs

function,

&c.

Marx,

e.g.,

denies

that

the

law

of

population

is

the

same

at

all

times

and

in

all

places.

He

asserts,

on

the

contrary,

that

every

stage

of

development

has

its

own

law

of

population.

...

With

the

varying

degree

of

development

of

productive

power,

social

conditions

and

the

laws

governing

them

vary

too.

Whilst

Marx

sets

himself

the

task

of

following

and

explaining

from

this

point

of

view

the

economic

system

established

by

the

sway

of

capital,

he

is

only

formulating,

in

a

strictly

scientific

manner,

the

aim

that

every

accurate

investigation

into

economic

life

must

have.

The

scientific

value

of

such

an

inquiry

lies

in

the

disclosing

of

the

special

laws

that

regulate

the

origin,

existence,

development,

death

of

a

given

social

organism

and

its

replacement

by

another

and

higher

one.

And

it

is

this

value

that,

in

point

of

fact,

Marx's

book

has.\"

Whilst

the

writer

pictures

what

he

takes

to

be

actually

my

method,

in

this

striking

and

[as

far

as

concerns

my

own

application

of

it]

generous

way,what

else

is

he

picturing

but

the

dialectic

method

Of

course

the

method

of

presentation

must

differ

in

form

from

that

of

inquiry.

The

latter

has

to

appropriate

the

material

in

detail,

to

analyse

its

different

forms

of

development,

to

trace

out

their

inner

connexion.

Only

after

this

work

is

done,

can

the

actual

movement

be

adequately

described.

If

this

is

done

successfully,

if

the

life

of

the

subject-matter

is

ideally

reflected

as

in

a

mirror,

then

it

may

appear

as

if

we

had

before

us

a

mere

a

priori

construction.

My

dialectic

method

is

not

only

different

from

the

Hegelian,

but

is

its

direct

opposite.

To

Hegel,

the

life

process

of

the

human

brain,

i.e.,

the

process

of

thinking,

which,

under

the

name

of

\"the

Idea,\"

he

even

transforms

into

an

independent

subject,

is

the

demiurgos

of

the

real

world,

and

the

real

world

is

only

the

external,

phenomenal

form

of

\"the

Idea.\"

With

me,

on

the

contrary,

the

ideal

is

nothing

else

than

the

material

world

reflected

by

the

human

mind,

and

translated

into

forms

of

thought.

The

mystifying

side

of

Hegelian

dialectic

I

criticised

nearly

thirty

years

ago,

at

a

time

when

it

was

still

the

fashion.

But

just

as

I

was

working

at

the

first

volume

of

\"Das

Kapital,\"

it

was

the

good

pleasure

of

the

peevish,

arrogant,

mediocre

Epigonoi

[Epigones

–Büchner,

Dühring

and

others]

who

now

talk

large

in

cultured

Germany,

to

treat

Hegel

in

same

way

as

the

brave

Moses

Mendelssohn

in

Lessing's

time

treated

Spinoza,

i.e.,

as

a

\"dead

dog.\"

I

therefore

openly

avowed

myself

the

pupil

of

that

mighty

thinker,

and

even

here

and

there,

in

the

chapter

on

the

theory

of

value,

coquetted

with

the

modes

of

expression

peculiar

to

him.

The

mystification

which

dialectic

suffers

in

Hegel's

hands,

by

no

means

prevents

him

from

being

the

first

to

present

its

general

form

of

working

in

a

comprehensive

and

conscious

manner.

With

him

it

is

standing

on

its

head.

It

must

be

turned

right

side

up

again,

if

you

would

discover

the

rational

kernel

within

the

mystical

shell.

In

its

mystified

form,

dialectic

became

the

fashion

in

Germany,

because

it

seemed

to

transfigure

and

to

glorify

the

existing

state

of

things.

In

its

rational

form

it

is

a

scandal

and

abomination

to

bourgeoisdom

and

its

doctrinaire

professors,

because

it

includes

in

its

comprehension

and

affirmative

recognition

of

the

existing

state

of

things,

at

the

same

time

also,

the

recognition

of

the

negation

of

that

state,of

its

inevitable

breaking

up;

because

it

regards

every

historically

developed

social

form

as

in

fluid

movement,

and

therefore

takes

into

account

its

transient

nature

not

less

than

its

momentary

existence;because

it

lets

nothing

impose

upon

it,

and

is

in

its

essence

critical

and

revolutionary.

The

contradictions

inherent

in

the

movement

of

capitalist

society

impress

themselves

upon

the

practical

bourgeois

most

strikingly

in

the

changes

of

the

periodic

cycle,

through

which

modern

industry

runs,

and

whose

crowning

point

is

the

universal

crisis.That

crisis

is

once

again

approaching,

although

as

yet

but

in

its

preliminary

stage;

and

by

the

universality

of

its

theatre

and

the

intensity

of

its

action

it

will

drum

dialectics

even

into

the

heads

of

the

mushroom

upstarts

of

the

new,

holy

Prusso-German

empire.

Karl

Marx

London

January

24,

1873

NOTES:

1Geschichtliche

Darstellung

des

Handels,

der

Gewerbe

und

des

Ackerbaus,

&c..

von

Gustav

von

Gülich.

5

vols.,

Jena.1830-45.

2See

my

work

\"Zur

Kritik,

&c.,\"

p.

39.

3The

mealy-mouthed

babblers

of

German

vulgar

economy

fell

foul

of

the

style

of

my

book.

No

one

can

feel

the

literary

shortcomings

in

\"Das

Kapital\"

more

strongly

than

I

myself.Yet

I

will

for

the

benefit

and

the

enjoyment

of

these

gentlemen

and

their

public

quote

in

this

connexion

one

English

and

one

Russian

notice.

The

Saturday

Review,

always

hostile

to

my

views,

said

in

its

notice

of

the

first

edition:

\"The

presentation

of

the

subject

invests

the

driest

economic

questions

with

a

certain

peculiar

charm.\"

The

\"St.

Petersburg

Journal\"

(Sankt

Peterburgskie

Viedomosti),

in

its

issue

of

April

8

(20),

1872,

says:

\"The

presentation

of

the

subject,

with

the

exception

of

one

or

two

exceptionally

special

parts,

is

distinguished

by

its

comprehensibility

by

the

general

reader,

its

clearness,

and,

in

spite

of

the

scientific

intricacy

of

the

subject,

by

an

unusual

liveliness.

In

this

respect

the

author

in

no

way

resembles

...the

majority

of

German

scholars

who

...

write

their

books

in

a

language

so

dry

and

obscure

that

the

heads

of

ordinary

mortals

are

cracked

by

it.\"

4Rezepte

–

translated

as

\"Receipt,\"

which

in

the

19th

Century,

meant

\"recipe\"

and

Ben

Fowkes,

for

example

translates

this

as

\"recipe.\"

[MIA

footnote].